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Abstract
The empirical literature on the determinants of charities’ donation income, distinguishing
the charitable cause, is small. We consider the case of development charities speciﬁcally.
Using a panel covering a quarter of a century, we observe a strong fundraising effect and
a unitary household income elasticity. We ﬁnd evidence that the conventionally identiﬁed
‘price’effectmay simply be the product of omitted variable bias. Our results further suggest
that public spending on development crowds in private donations for development.We ﬁnd
a positive spillover effect of fundraising, suggesting the efforts of one development charity
may increase contributions to other development charities.
I. Introduction
Discussion of development ﬁnance often focuses on Ofﬁcial Development Assistance
(ODA), given by governments in the form of bilateral or multilateral aid. However, contri-
butions from private individuals are also prominent. These include both remittances from
migrants (e.g. Solimano, 2005) and the donations made to charities working abroad for
overseas aid and humanitarian assistance, which have received much less attention from
*This research was supported by ESRC grant RES-155-25-0061 (‘Giving to Development’), which formed part
of the Non-Governmental Public Action programme. The project was conducted in conjunction with TonyAtkinson,
Cathy Pharoah and Sylke Schnepf and we thank them for very helpful discussion and suggestions; we draw on our
joint work developing the panel database reported onAtkinson et al. (2012), but errors in the current article are ours
alone. We are grateful to the Charities Aid Foundation for access to their data; data from Charity Trends from 2001
onwards are used also with permission of Waterlow Ltd who retain the copyright in them. We thank Ian Mocroft for
help in documenting government funding of development charities and Robin Naylor, David Clifford and the editor
and referees for comments and suggestions.
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researchers. The large theoretical and empirical literatures on charitable giving tend not to
distinguish giving by cause (Andreoni, 2006). In this article, we model donations received
by overseas development charities in the UK, the total of which, in 2004–5, equalled about
a quarter of theUK’sODA.We use a newly constructed panel on individual charity ﬁnances
that spans over 25 years.
Our focus on giving for overseas development rather than total giving allows us to
pay more attention to the particular characteristics of giving to this cause. We draw in
part on the theoretical model in Atkinson (2009), which explicitly considers the giving to
overseas development charities by private individuals. We extend the existing empirical
literature on charities’ donation incomes that has focused on charity level factors, such as
fundraising and government grants received by charities, by introducing aggregate donor
characteristics, ODA and humanitarian crises within a single framework, allowing also for
possible dynamics. Section II outlines this approach. Sections III and IV describe our data
and econometric approach. Section V presents results and section VI concludes.
II. Modelling charitable giving for development
Charities receive income from sources such as the sale of goods and services, grants
and voluntary contributions in the form of money donations which have generally been
modelled as a function of either donor characteristics or charity characteristics. On the
donor side, theory describes behaviour based on public goods and ‘warm-glow’ motives
and the empirical literature focuses on modelling donations as a function of personal
characteristics such as income using household or individual level data (see Peloza and
Steel, 2005). On the charities’ side, a smaller body of theory describes their activities (e.g.
Steinberg, 1986; Steinberg and Weisbrod, 2005), much of it focused on their objective
function.The related empiricalwork (e.g.Weisbrod andDominguez, 1986;Khanna, Posnett
and Sandler, 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Tinkelman, 2004) has sought to model
donation receipts as a function of charity characteristics such as fundraising expenditure,
often testing hypotheses about charity objectives.
In both approaches, the cause (e.g. health, education, development) supported by
donations or served by the charity is typically ignored. But, in general, people give
deliberately to a speciﬁc cause and charities are established to serve a particular purpose.
Atkinson (2009) argues that the public goods andwarm-glowmodels each fail to capture key
aspects of giving for international development and proposes a new ‘identiﬁcation’model
that incorporates elements of both.1 Empirical studies may estimate a model for different
charitable causes, though there are generally no cause-speciﬁc variables in the models.
Moreover, models of donor behaviour that ignore the activities of charities, or vice versa,
may be mis-speciﬁed as the donation expenditure of households and receipts of charities
are two sides of the same coin and are a function of both donor and charity characteristics.
Andreoni (2006) emphasizes that ‘the interaction between supply and demand for philan-
thropy has been largely neglected in both theoretical and empirical analysis’. Our empirical
model contains elements suggested fromwork on both sides of the market, integrating both
1
Atkinson’s model is similar in spirit to the ‘impact giving’ model of Duncan (2004), although Duncan had no
speciﬁc charitable cause in mind.
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aggregate donor and individual charity characteristics into a single framework, as well as
considering development-speciﬁc macro determinants of donations to development char-
ities, namely, ODA and large humanitarian crises affecting the developing world.
From the donor side, we focus on household income, emphasized in the warm-glow
approach and the identiﬁcationmodel.The quarter-century covered by our panel of charities
saw a 1.6-fold increase in real after-tax household incomes in the UK. Income growth was
far from steady across the period which covers the recessions of the early 1980s and early
1990s. Besides total income, we also allow for changes in its distribution. Over the period
as a whole, inequality of incomes rose substantially. Glazer and Konrad (1996) present a
signalling model of charitable giving that predicts an increase in giving arising from an
increase in inequality. But in the case of international development charities, an increase
in domestic inequality may cause donors to shift their giving towards domestic services
and away from international ones. We include a dummy variable from 2001 to control for
a policy change that led to a more substantial tax incentive for giving. ‘Gift Aid’ allows
the recipient charity to reclaim the basic rate (22% in 2000) income tax paid on the gift
effectively increasing the value of the donation. Prior to 2000, the incentive was limited to
cash donations in excess of £600. In 2000, this lower limit was removed.
From the charity side, we follow the existing practice by considering the impact of
fundraising, a constructed ‘price’, government grants, and other autonomous or
non-voluntary, income. Within Atkinson’s identiﬁcation model, fundraising campaigns
help increase the awareness of recipients’ need, increasing donations made to the charity
undertaking the expenditure. However, that expenditure may also affect donations made
to other charities via a spillover effect, not previously allowed for in the charity literature.
The fundraising of one charity may raise awareness of development issues and so increase
donationsmade to all charities in the sector. Or, it may increase the relative appeal to donors
of that particular charity, diverting contributions away from other development charities.
Evidence of a positive spillover effect has been found for private, for-proﬁt ﬁrms. For
example, Sahni (2013) ﬁnds evidence that one restaurant’s advertising increases sales
made by its competitors serving similar food. We test for the presence of an analogous
spillover effect from fundraising.
Following Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986), fundraising
has also been assumed to affect negatively the ‘price’ of donations – a measure of the cost
to a donor of increasing charitable output of a charity by £1. The identiﬁcation of the price
effect has been central to this literature and appears in nearly every empirical model of
donations.
Tinkelman (2004) deﬁnes the price aspt = 1/ (1 − ft−1)where f = F/D is the proportion
of total donations, D, spent by the charity on fundraising, F , in the previous period.2
Donor utility can be modelled as a function of the welfare of the recipients of the charities’
‘output’ or charitable expenditure. The price of increasing ‘output’ by one unit accounts
for the proportion of the donation that goes to any expense other than the end-recipients
(ignoring any indirect beneﬁt to them). We use Tinkelman’s deﬁnition and follow him
and others (e.g. Okten and Weisbrod, 2000) in excluding administrative expenditure from
2
Very similar deﬁnitions are used inWeisbrod and Dominguez (1986), Steinberg (1986), Khanna et al. (1995) and
Khanna and Sandler (2000).
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the construction of our price variable, and our model, as we agree that ‘there is no clear
way of reliably computing the relevant portion of the organization’s total administrative
costs’ (Tinkelman, 2004: 2183). The lag is used because donors cannot observe price in
the period in which they donate as the information necessary for its construction is not
available until a charity’s annual report is submitted at year-end (Okten andWeisbrod, 2000;
Tinkelman, 2004). Use of the lag also addresses possible endogeneity but raises concerns
about neglected dynamics. A negative price effect, found by several authors may simply
result from omitting an autoregressive process when modelling donations, something our
econometric speciﬁcation deals with.
We include a control of non-voluntary income, as is often done in the literature (e.g.
Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000). Charities with higher levels of non-
voluntary income coming from, say, high street shops, may ﬁnd it easier to raise donations
given this added exposure. Conversely, donors may see such charities as less in need of
donations.
The issue of how the grant income of a charity affects its donations has received much
attention (e.g. Kingma, 1989; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Andreoni and Payne, 2011).
Government grants may crowd out donation income – donors seeing the charity as less
needy.3 Or, they may ‘crowd in’giving, being viewed by donors as a signal that a charity is
worth supporting. There are also arguments for no impact: Horne et al. (2005) ﬁnd that US
donors have little knowledge of the government grants received by the charities to which
they give. In the case of the UK overseas development charities, these grants represented
about £250m in 2004–5, compared to donations of about £1bn (Atkinson et al., 2012).
Over the period we consider, they grew enormously, by a factor of 10 between the late
1970s and the mid-1990s when there was a levelling off.
GovernmentODA features prominently inAtkinson’s identiﬁcationmodel: it inﬂuences
the living standards of the recipients with whom the donor identiﬁes, reducing the marginal
impact of a donation on the welfare of the recipient. This provides another possible source
of crowding-out, leading to lower donations.4 Alternatively, ‘crowding in’can be expected
if increases in ODA raise donors’ perceptions of need by drawing attention to problems of
developing countries. The UK government’s prominent commitment in the late 1990s to
increase ODA and its continued pledge to sustain development assistance might be seen in
this light. Finally, some donors may of course be unaware of ODA levels or changes. The
scale of ofﬁcial assistance in relation to private donations demands that we include ODA
as an explanatory variable in our empirical model.
An empirical model that focuses on international development charities needs to recog-
nise emergency relief as an important inﬂuence on giving.A major humanitarian crisis can
have an immediate and large impact on the donor perceptions of need that are at the heart
of the identiﬁcation model. The period we consider includes two such crises: the Ethiopian
famine in 1984–85 and the Asian Tsunami of Christmas 2004. Both saw huge responses
from private donors which we seek to measure.
3
Andreoni and Payne (2011) present evidence that the observed crowding out in studies using US data operates
largely via changes in the fundraising behaviour of charities which receive grants.
4
However, Atkinson (2009) notes that ODA and private donations may not be perfect substitutes. Were they to
fund different, complementary activities, ODA would encourage donations. He offers the example of ODA funding
school construction while donations fund textbooks.
© 2014 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Overseas development assistance 195
Finally, in a major departure from previous practice, we initially allow for a general
dynamic model. Whereas previous studies used lagged regressors to avoid endogeneity
(Khanna et al., 1995; Okten andWeisbrod, 2000), we begin with a general dynamic model
including contemporaneous and lagged regressors, including lagged donations. There
are good institutional reasons for such a dynamic speciﬁcation. Many individuals make
donations through bank standing orders, which they fail to adjust each year as their circum-
stances change. Consider a charity that hires fundraisers to ﬁnd new donors among high
street shoppers. Donors typically sign up to give indeﬁnitely and the charity’s fundraising
expenditure in that year produces a continued stream of income. The speciﬁcation we use
allows us to separate out the persistence found in the donations data that is due to an un-
observed charity-speciﬁc effect from that due to the effect coming via lagged donations.
The dynamics also allow us to separate the long-run from the short-run effects of the
explanatory variables.
Taken together, our approach allows us to control simultaneously for the characteristics
of donors, the characteristics of charities, the environment in which donations are made
and potential dynamics determining donations.
III. Data
Our data come from the Charity Trends reports published by the Charities Aid Foundation
(CAF) from 1978 to 2006, covering donations to 2004.5 The reports document the annual
revenues and expenditures of the leadingUK fundraising charities.We obtain our donations
variable by subtracting the ﬁgure for legacies from the total reported ‘voluntary income’, the
variable on which the CAF rankings are based. CAF ﬁrst included the top 200 fundraising
charities, increasing coverage to the top 300 in 1985, the top 400 in 1986 and the top
500 from 1991. There was no report in 1995 and we did not have access to the report
from 1981. We assign observations to a calendar year by applying the rule that where
the charity’s reporting year ﬁnishes before June 30th, the observation is assigned to the
previous calendar year.
The resulting panel is unbalanced and has gaps. The gaps appear for various reasons
including changing accounting years, duplicate data used by CAF from one year to the
next, the unavailable CAF reports or because a charity drops out of the rankings for a year.6
Where a gap of a single year appears, we linearly interpolate the missing values by using
the observations for the preceding and following years.7 We test the sensitivity of results
to the exclusion of these ﬁlled-in observations.
Although the charities for which we have data represent only a small fraction of the
roughly 160,000 registered UK charities, they form a large share of the economic activity
5
The last report in this series was published in 2007 but the information for donations is not consistent with that
in earlier reports. Khanna et al. (1995) and Khanna and Sandler (2000) also used CAF data but just for eight years.
6
Charities sometimes neglected to respond to CAF’s requests for their ﬁnancial reports. Rather than exclude them
charities from the rankings, CAF would use the data from the previous year. We have identiﬁed and removed these
duplicate observations. Full details of our assembly and cleaning of the panel are given in Atkinson et al. (2008).
7
In two cases (ActionAid and UNICEF), we know the charity existed and was large enough to enter the rankings
in the ﬁrst years they were compiled but these charities were excluded for some reason. In these two cases, we apply
the average growth rate over the three subsequent years (1981–83) to ﬁll in the missing data for 1978–81.
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of the charitable sector. The largest 500 charities by donated income account for about
half of all such income (Charities Aid Foundation, 2004: ix, 21 and 40). The great bulk
of donations come from individuals; a small part comes from the corporate sector and
grant-making charitable trusts but these donations cannot be separated in the data.
Our focus is on the development charities. We include both the charities under this
heading in the CAF reports and the ‘religious international’ charities that are separately
identiﬁed. The development charities include a number that serve domestic as well as
overseas causes, for example, the Red Cross and Save the Children. The data set contains
70 development charities that appear in Charity Trends at least once during the period, of
which we drop two – see below – leaving 68. We lose a further 12 (only 35 charity-years
in total) as there must be at least three consecutive observations for our estimation method
(see section IV).
In terms of aggregate giving for development, there was a striking rise in the real
value of donations across the period we consider, with an average annual growth rate for
overseas charities among the top 200 fundraisers of nearly 7.5%, a little above that for
charities as a whole. This growth far outstripped the 2% average annual growth in real
after-tax household income. It was also far larger than the rise in the UK government’s
ODA, which grew unevenly in real terms by a factor of just 1.5. 1984–85 saw a spike in
overseas donations due to the response to the Ethiopian famine.This was in part stimulated
by Bob Geldof, who organized the Band Aid Christmas single in 1984 and the Live Aid
concerts in 1985. Geldof’s Band Aid Trust was the charity with the most donations in the
UK in 1985 – among all causes – with £122m (2007 prices). We exclude this charity from
our analysis as it was not founded to engage in annual fundraising. Its removal still leaves
a spike in the two years. For example, Oxfam had a record year in 1984, with its £109m of
donations (2007 prices) nearly double the level of the year before. We also exclude Comic
Relief which raises funds with a telethon and associated events every two years, so it does
not raise funds each year like other charities.8
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the continuous variables entered in our model.
The unit of analysis in panel (a) is the charity-year. Mean annual donations received by
development charities is £11.7m (2007 prices). Fundraising statistics are conditional on
fundraising being recorded as positive – information is missing or is recorded as zero for
11% of development charities. The percentage of zeroes or missing data are substantially
higher for government grants, 39%, for which the statistics are also based on positive
values. The absence of positive values for fundraising is not easy to understand – these are
all charities that are among the top 500 in terms of donated income and it does not seem
likely that this status can be attained without spending money on raising funds. Following
Tinkelman (2004), we exclude observations with zero recorded or missing fundraising
expenditure information and we test the sensitivity of our results to their inclusion. Zeroes
or missing values for government grants are easier to understand – many charities do not
get such grants. Only seven observations have zero non-voluntary income.9 We include all
8
We exclude the Priory of St John (St John Ambulance), which was included among development charities by
CAF and missionary charities.
9
The manner in which shop income is reported in charity accounts changed in 1995. Prior to 1995, charities tended
to reported the net proﬁt of their shops. A change in the Charity Commissions ‘Statement of Recommended Practice
(SORP)’ lead charities to switch to reporting the gross value of these goods. A number of charities asked the CAF to
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TABLE 1
Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD
(a) Charity speciﬁc
Voluntary contributions (£’000s) 11,713.49 18,287.28
Fundraising | > 0 (£’000s) 2,367.75 4,095.00
Zero fundraising reported 0.11 0.31
Grants | > 0 (£’000s) 8,289.88 13,039.11
Zero grants reported 0.40 0.49
Non-voluntary income (£’000s) 8,516.94 16,518.91
Price 1.25 0.31
Observations 868 —
(b) Macroeconomic variables
Household income (£ billions) 511.53 94.80
Gini 0.31 0.03
Post-2000 tax 0.14 0.35
Observations 27 —
(c) Development speciﬁc
ODA (£ billions) 3.01 0.57
Tsunami 0.01 0.12
1984 dummy 0.02 0.15
1985 dummy 0.03 0.16
Observations 27 —
Notes: Panel (a) refers to the charity-level variables; panel (b) refers to
theMacroeconomic variables and panel (c) refers to the development spe-
ciﬁc Macroeconomic variables. The statistics for fundraising and grants
are based on the positive values only.
observations, with a dummy variable to capture the impact of zero grant income relative to
positive grant income. Panel (b) summarizes the macroeconomic variables common to all
charities in a given year: total household income, the Gini coefﬁcient for household income
and a dummy capturing the change to Gift Aid in 2000. In panel (c), we summarize the
development-speciﬁc variables: ODA and humanitarian crises. ODAﬁgures include grants
paid to charities, so we use the values net of these grants (they constitute only a small part of
the total – about 5% in 2004).We also use dummies for 1984 and 1985 to capture the impact
of the Ethiopian famine and for 2004 given the Boxing Day Tsunami. The dummy for the
Boxing Day Tsunami takes the value one for charities whose ﬁnancial year ended in the
ﬁrst half of 2005.These charities are assigned to 2004 according to our rule outlined above.
However, their ﬁnancial reports will capture at least some of any increase in donations that
arose from the Boxing Day Tsunami at the end of 2004. This applies to seven charities.
Following Tinkelman (2004) and Okten andWeisbrod (2000), we use the natural loga-
rithm of all the continuous variables in our model, except the Gini.The model also includes
dummy variables for zero grant income (noted above).
continue reporting the net proﬁts to avoid affecting. In the case of Oxfam, by far the largest earner of shop income
on our data, we have adjusted the ﬁgures from 1995–2004 by the ratio of the net proﬁt to the gross value in 1995–98.
These ﬁgures were obtained from Oxfam’s annual reports.
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IV. Model speciﬁcation and estimation
We start with a general dynamic speciﬁcation allowing current and lagged variables, in-
cluding lagged donations, to affect donations such that:
yit = yit−1 +
1∑
k=0
x′t−k+
1∑
k=0
z′it−k+D′it+ eit , (1)
where i and t index charities and years respectively, yit is the charity’s (log) donations and
eit = i + it is a composite error term where i is a charity-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect (possibly
correlated with the included regressors) and it is a well-behaved error term. The vector zit
contains the charity-speciﬁc variables: log fundraising expenditure, log government grants,
log non-voluntary income and the log of the ‘price’ variable.10
The vector xt includes the macroeconomic variables and the development speciﬁc vari-
ables affecting the environment in which donations to overseas development are made: the
log of total household income, the Gini coefﬁcient for household income and the log of
ODA (net of grants paid). The vectorD includes dummy variables to capture the very large
disasters that occurred during the observation period, the Ethiopian famine in 1984–5 and
the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. These dummies are not lagged. We consider the possible
spillover effects apart from the main analysis below.
There are several econometric issues that need to be addressed in the estimation of
equation (1). The current values of fundraising, non-voluntary income and grants may
be correlated with the contemporaneous error term eit . A positive shock to donations
means that a charity can afford to spend more on fundraising. Such a shock could have
positive or negative effects on the government grants it receives, depending on how these
grants are allocated. If the correlation between eit and the regressors can be captured by
the unobserved heterogeneity i and we did not include the lag of donations among an
explanatory variables, the within-group (WG) estimator would be consistent. However, in
a dynamicmodel containing a lag of the dependent variable, such as ours, theWGestimator
is biased in small samples although the bias goes to zero as T increases (Nickell, 1981).
A standard approach to the estimation of dynamic panel data models with endogenous
regressors is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) applied to the ﬁrst differenced
equation (GMM-diff) in order to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity i that might be
correlated with the regressors. However, as our panel has gaps, we use the forward ortho-
gonal deviation (FOD) transformation (Arellano and Bover, 1995).11 This transformation
eliminates i while preserving sample sizes in panel data with gaps as it is computable
for all but the ﬁnal observation.12 GMM estimates are obtained using xtabond2 in Stata
(Roodman, 2009a).13
10
We do not include the age of each charity as is done in Tinkelman (1999, 2004) and in Khanna and Sandler
(2000) because in the within-group approach we use the age would reduce to an individual time trend.
11
Instead of subtracting the previous observation from the current, the FOD transformation subtracts the av-
erage of all future available observations. Formally, forward orthogonal transformation will transform yit to√
(Tit / (Tit +1))
(
yit − (1/ Tit)∑s>t yis
)
. The weighting equalizes the variances in the above transformation.
12
With ﬁrst-differencing if a particular yit is missing, then both yit = yit − yit−1 and yit+1 will be missing.
13
A more detailed discussion of GMM can be found in Appendix S1.
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We use tests for over-identiﬁcation and the tests for ﬁrst and second order serial cor-
relations to choose our preferred speciﬁcation and the set of instruments. The ﬁrst is the
Sargan test for over-identiﬁcation (Sargan, 1958), which requires non-rejection of the null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The Sargan test is robust to instrument prolifera-
tion (see Roodman, 2009b) but not to heteroscedasticity.We therefore also use the Hansen
test (Hansen, 1982) that, like the Sargan test, requires non-rejection of the null hypothesis
that the instruments are valid. The Hansen test, however, is robust to heteroscedasticity,
but not to instrument proliferation. A large number of instruments can severely weaken
the Hansen test producing questionably high P-values. We also use serial correlation tests
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). White noise errors "it would imply a MA(1) process for the
 it , thus the speciﬁcation test is passed by rejecting the null of no ﬁrst order [AR(1)]
serial correlation but not rejecting the null of no second order [AR(2)] serial correlation.
Our main regression results are presented in Table 2 with results of speciﬁcation tests
reported at the bottom of the table. Note that, all the models inTable 2 were estimated using
only those observations with positive values for fundraising. The grants effect is estimated
using the positive values of grants as we include a dummy (not reported) to capture the
zero reported grants income. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
(the charities are the clusters).
Column (1) is a fully dynamic speciﬁcation, with all charity-speciﬁc and macro-
economic variables characteristics, aswell asODA, entered contemporaneously and lagged
one period estimated via GMM treating all contemporaneous charity-speciﬁc regressors
and the lagged donations as endogenous. This speciﬁcation fails the Sargan test (affected
by heteroscedasticity) but passes the Hansen test (affected by instrument proliferation).
Neither the lagged nor the contemporaneous effects are individually signiﬁcant at the 5%
level and they are also jointly insigniﬁcant (P-value= 0.929) indicating that themodel may
be over-parameterised and thus suffers from a high degree of multicollinearity. To address
this, we drop the laggedmacroeconomic variables characteristics and re-estimate themodel
using GMM [column (2)], treating all the charity-speciﬁc regressors, including lagged
donations, as endogenous.Thismodel also fails the Sargan test, but again passes theHansen
test. Of the lagged effects, only the lagged donations is signiﬁcant. The other lags are not
individually nor jointly signiﬁcant (P-value = 0.765). As multicollinearity still affects the
identiﬁcation of the charity-speciﬁc effects, we further simplify the speciﬁcation in column
(3), where we estimate a partial adjustment model (only a lagged dependent variable)
using GMM, again treating all the charity-speciﬁc regressors, including lagged donations,
as endogenous. This model performs well on all the speciﬁcation tests. In column (4), we
re-estimate the partial adjustment model using GMM, though here we treat only the lagged
donations and the price (a function of lagged donations) as endogenous. In column (5), we
estimate the partial adjustment model via WG using the sample used for the GMM.14 In
column (6), we re-estimate the partial adjustment model viaWG using all the observations
with positive fundraising.
The results obtained viaWG are extremely similar to those obtained via GMM suggest-
ing that: (i) the Nickell bias is mitigated by our large T and (ii) the potential endogeneity
of the charity-speciﬁc variables does not adversely affect the consistency of the WG esti-
14
The sample size is reduced as we use three period lags in the instrument set.
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TABLE 2
Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM WG WG
Charity speciﬁc
Lagged log donations 0.203 0.427* 0.583*** 0.683*** 0.498*** 0.502***
(0.268) (0.218) (0.186) (0.090) (0.155) (0.172)
Log fundraising 0.064 0.074 0.152* 0.119*** 0.175*** 0.186**
(0.204) (0.150) (0.091) (0.042) (0.059) (0.081)
t−1 0.099 −0.049 — — — —
(0.118) (0.088) — — — —
Log non-voluntary income −0.007 0.008 0.041 0.011 0.020 0.022
(0.049) (0.044) (0.037) (0.026) (0.041) (0.038)
t−1 0.016 −0.009 — — — —
(0.042) (0.030) — — — —
Log grants −0.067 0.054 0.038 0.001 0.017 0.011
(0.091) (0.039) (0.031) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
t−1 −0.000 −0.003 — — — —
(0.054) (0.017) — — — —
Log price −0.849* −0.219 −0.180 — −0.164 −0.036
(0.465) (0.297) (0.251) (0.156) (0.174)
t−1 0.106 −0.159 — — — —
(0.274) (0.163) — — — —
Macroeconomic variables
Log household income 0.095 1.777*** 0.924*** 0.613** 1.167*** 0.748*
(3.744) (0.677) (0.358) (0.240) (0.348) (0.378)
t−1 2.170 — — — — —
(8.696) — — — — —
Gini −5.324 −5.036** −3.697* −1.749 −3.947** −1.964
(73.906) (2.530) (2.069) (1.331) (1.761) (1.951)
t−1 1.257 — — — — —
(37.051) — — — — —
Post-2000 dummy −0.284 −0.102 −0.108 −0.063 −0.094 −0.036
(0.428) (0.071) (0.080) (0.058) (0.083) (0.070)
Development speciﬁc
Log ODA −0.643 0.236 0.116 0.038 0.071 0.040
(0.982) (0.258) (0.156) (0.092) (0.190) (0.139)
t−1 −1.793 — — — — —
(3.374) — — — — —
Tsunami 0.225 0.196 0.301*** 0.345*** 0.266*** 0.298***
(0.520) (0.144) (0.096) (0.082) (0.095) (0.091)
1984 dummy 0.333 0.339** 0.698* 0.356** 0.336** 0.381**
(0.333) (0.151) (0.410) (0.150) (0.140) (0.151)
1985 dummy 0.220 0.061 0.082 0.052 0.055 0.099
(0.357) (0.125) (0.105) (0.068) (0.086) (0.083)
(continued)
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TABLE 2
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM WG WG
Number of observations 566 566 633 633 633 684
R2 — — — — 0.645 0.643
Number of instruments 25 25 25 18 — —
Number of lags 3 3 3 3 — —
AR(1) P-value 0.039 0.005 0.010 0.032 — —
AR(2) P-value 0.909 0.477 0.360 0.420 — —
Hansen P-value 0.318 0.522 0.221 0.467 — —
Sargan P-value 0.050 0.004 0.230 0.137 — —
Notes: GMM, Generalized Method of Moments; WG, within-group. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Results in columns (1)–(4) were obtained via GMM. In columns (1)–(3), we treat all contemporaneous charity-
speciﬁc variables and lagged donations as endogenous. In column (4), we treat only lagged donations and the price
as endogenous. The remaining results were obtained using the WG estimator. Results from speciﬁcation tests are
presented at the bottom of the table. For GMM to be consistent, we must reject the AR(1) test, fail to reject the
AR(2) test as well as the Sargan and Hansen tests.Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance according to the following
schedule: *10%, **5% and ***1%.
mates. Given that the relative complexity of the GMM approach provides no value added
in terms of consistency or unbiasedness and imposes a cost in terms of efﬁciency, we opt to
proceed with the simplerWG estimation and take the results in column (6) as our baseline.
As a robustness check, we test the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients obtained in our
baseline model are statistically equivalent to those coefﬁcients obtained in a number of
alternative speciﬁcations: (i) adding observationswith zero reported ormissing fundraising
data (P-value = 0.706);15 (ii) the exclusion of Oxfam, far and away the largest development
charitymaking upbetween a sixth and a third of total donations to development charities in a
given year (p-value > 0.999); (iii) the use of year ﬁxed effects in place of themacroeconomic
variables and development-speciﬁc variables (P-value = 0.289); (iv) the exclusion of the
ﬁlled in observations, discussed above (P-value = 0.122) and (v) to sample selection due to
the changing number of charities in the rankings (for the top 400: P-value = 0.122 and for
the top 500: P-value = 0.100). The full results for these robustness checks are presented in
Table A1 of Appendix S1. We also check the robustness of the GMM results to different
instrument sets, the results of which are in Table A2 of Appendix S1. In general, the
estimated coefﬁcients vary little in terms ofmagnitude and signiﬁcance over these different
speciﬁcations demonstrating the robustness of the results in the baseline model [column
(6), Table 2], on which the following discussion is based.
V. Discussion
Given the partial adjustment speciﬁcation, the reported coefﬁcients are interpreted as short-
run effects and the corresponding long-run effects are given by / (1−), where  = ,.
15
To do this, we add a dummy variable to pick up observations with non-positive fundraising expenditure (we
have noted the prevalence of zeroes above.) In both this case and in our baseline case, the effect of fundraising on
donations is estimated from the positive values only.
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The coefﬁcient on lagged donations is 0.50 and is well-deﬁned indicating that the short-run
effects are about half the size of the long-run effects.
We estimate a short-run fundraising elasticity of 0.19 with a long-run effect equal to
0.37. The long-run effects are similar in magnitude to the partial fundraising elasticities
from earlier work (Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Tinkelman,
2004) which were necessarily interpreted as long-run effects. We discuss the estimated
fundraising effect in greater detail below. Neither non-voluntary income nor grants have
an effect for either development.
The coefﬁcient on the price of giving is close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant,
as is the long-run price effect ( = −0.07, P-value = 0.348). However, when we estimate
a static version of our model (not presented), the coefﬁcient on the price effect is nega-
tive ( = −0.80) and signiﬁcant (SE = 0.19, P-value < 0.001), consistent with the general
results in earlier work (e.g. Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Tinkelman,
2004).That the price effect falls toward zero and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant in a par-
tial adjustment speciﬁcation suggests that the signiﬁcant price effect estimated elsewhere
may be driven by omitted variable bias from an otherwise unaccounted for autoregressive
process in donations rather than a genuine responsiveness to changes in the severity of
‘leakages’ perceived by donors, that is, the price. The direction of the omitted variable bias
is consistent with  > 0 and @pt/@Dt−1 < 0, where  is the coefﬁcient on lagged donations.
The signiﬁcance of the price effect generally found in the literature may lead charities to
spend too little on fundraising as the total estimated fundraising effectwill be diminished by
the price effect. For example,Okten andWeisbrod (2000) conclude that the total fundraising
effect, which takes into consideration the impact of the price, is not statistically different
from zero. Such results may also lead charities to systematically under-report the amount
they do spend on fundraising (Froehlich and Knoepﬂe, 1996) as they try to mitigate the
perceived negative price effect.
The estimated short-run household income elasticity of donations in column (6), Table
2 is 0.75 and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a short-run unitary income elasticity
(P-value = 0.508). We also fail to reject unitary elasticity for the long-run effect, equal to
1.50 (P-value = 0.550).
Evidence for the impact of the income distribution is mixed. The coefﬁcient on the
Gini coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant and of an economically important magnitude in
columns (2), (3) and (5) of Table 2. While the point estimate remains negative and of an
economically important magnitude in column (6), it is no longer statistically signiﬁcant
at conventional levels. The signiﬁcant effect in column (5) suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in the Gini coefﬁcient leads to a 12% decrease in donations to develop-
ment, on average and ceteris paribus. This result conﬂicts with the prediction of Glazer and
Konrad (1996), though their model has no development-speciﬁc component. It is difﬁcult,
however, to draw conclusions from such a inconsistently identiﬁed effect (it tends to be
insigniﬁcant in our robustness checks) and more work is needed in this area. The change
in Gift Aid in 2000 did not affect contributions to development charities.
The coefﬁcient onODA is not signiﬁcant.We also estimated themodel using alternative
speciﬁcations of ODA (levels, share of GDP) but results were consistently insigniﬁcant
when the effect was assumed constant over time. The relationship between ODA and
donationsmay not, however, be adequately described by such a restrictive speciﬁcation.We
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Figure 1. ODA and giving for development
Notes: This ﬁgure plots the relationship between Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (ODA) and total donations
made to development charities among Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)’s top 200 in each year. The triangular
markers and the dashed line are the scatter plot and linear ﬁt, respectively, for the years 1978–83. The circular
markers and solid line are the scatter plot and linear ﬁt, respectively, for the years 1984–2004.
ﬁnd evidence of a change in the relationship between ODA and donations to development
following the Ethiopian famine of themid-1980s (the effect ofwhichwe discuss below).We
plot the total donations made to development charities among the largest 200 fundraising
charities in each year against the annual level of ODA, using log scales on both axes
(see Figure 1). The triangular markers and dashed line show the scatter plot and linear ﬁt,
respectively, for 1978–83.The circular markers and solid line are the scatter plot and linear
ﬁt, respectively, for 1984–2004.
From 1978 to 1983, there is evidence that ODA ‘crowded out’ donations; as ODA
fell (by 25% from 1978 to 1983) total donations to development charities in the top 200
increased by 50%. However, from the onset of the Ethiopian famine in 1984, there is a
marked change in the relationship and the graphical evidence suggests ‘crowding in’. To
test this econometrically, we re-estimate our base line model adding a dummy for those
years 1984–2004 and an interaction termbetween this dummyand the log ofODA, allowing
the effect of ODA to differ between the two periods. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term
is signiﬁcant, indicating that the effect of ODA does change between the two periods. The
estimated effect of log ODA before 1984 is −0.40 (P-value = 0.02). From 1984 onwards,
the estimated effect (the linear combination of the coefﬁcient on log ODA and that on the
interaction term) is 0.38 (P-value = 0.06), consistent with what we observe graphically.16
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The severity of the crisis and the effect Live Aid had on popular culture (Street, 1997)
seems to have affected a lasting change in the relationship between the state provision and
the private provision of development assistance. The social psychology underpinning such
a shift is, however, beyond the scope of this article. Note the other coefﬁcients were not
qualitatively changed from our baseline model.
Both the Ethiopian famine and the Boxing Day Tsunami had a powerful, positive
impact on giving for development. The Ethiopian famine saw donations to the devel-
opment charities included in our panel increase, on average, by around a third in 1984.
The insigniﬁcance of the 1985 dummy suggests that the continuation of the famine did not
have an analogous impact in 1985. In fact, several large overseas charities, for example,
Oxfam, saw donations fall from 1984 to 1985, presumably as donations were diverted to
the Band Aid Trust, which we exclude from our panel for a reason given earlier. Total
giving for development, including to Band Aid, actually increased by around a ﬁfth from
1984 to 1985. The Boxing DayTsunami had a similar impact on donations to development
charities, seeing them increase by about 30%.
We next turn our attention to two additional issues. First, we consider the distribution
of the marginal fundraising effects. Second, we test for possible fundraising externalities.
The distributions of marginal effects
It has long been recognized by researchers that the objective function of charity managers
might be inferred from the marginal effectiveness of fundraising expenditure (Steinberg,
1986; Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986). Managers maximizing the gross revenue of the
charity will fundraise until the marginal pound spent on fundraising brings in no additional
funding.Managersmaximizing net revenues (net of fundraising expenditure)will fundraise
until the marginal pound spent on fundraising brings in one pound of additional funds.This
is sometimes called programme service maximization.
Conclusions about the objective functions of charity managers based on the estimated
marginal effect of fundraising may depend on whether it is the marginal effect calculated at
the mean characteristics or the mean marginal effect that is being interpreted (Tinkelman,
2004).The short-runmarginal fundraising effect, calculated at themean characteristics, for
development charities is 0.97, obtained by multiplying the coefﬁcient on log fundraising
[taken from Table 2, column (6)] by the ratio of the mean of donations to the mean of
fundraising expenditure for the sample used in estimation. Alternatively, we can assume
that the estimated elasticities are constant over charities and time and so calculate a charity-
year speciﬁc marginal effect. Table 3 shows the distribution of the short- and long-run
marginal effects of fundraising in columns (1) and (2), respectively.
Consistent with Tinkelman (2004), the mean effect is larger than the marginal effect
calculated at the mean characteristics. This supports Tinkelman’s claim that the mean
effect can inadequately describe the behaviour of the ‘average’ charity as the distribution
of the effects can be skewed by extreme (low) values of fundraising expenditure. The
extreme values also inﬂate the standard deviation of the distribution of marginal effects
16
We also estimated this model for non-development charities and found no evidence that ODA ever affected
giving to non-development charities.
© 2014 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Overseas development assistance 205
TABLE 3
Distribution of the short-run and long-run marginal
effects
(1) (2)
Short-run Long-run
Minimum 0.22 0.43
5th percentile 0.44 0.87
25th percentile 0.71 1.41
Median 1.15 2.27
75th percentile 2.31 4.54
95th percentile 7.49 14.25
99th percentile 101.03 163.22
Maximum 241.28 242.64
Mean effect 4.18 6.64
SD 17.06 22.18
Between SD 20.99 33.30
Within SD 7.23 9.27
Effect at mean characteristics 0.97 1.84
Observations 684 684
Notes: The marginal effects are calculated using the
estimated fundraising elasticity obtained in our baseline
model multiplied by the ratio of donations to fundraising
for each charity-year.
and so conclusions about the behaviour of charity managers can be sensitive to whether
the analysis is of marginal effect calculated at the mean characteristics or of the mean
marginal effect. In our case, the short-run marginal effect calculated at the mean values of
fundraising and donations is about a quarter of the size of the the mean marginal effect.
The median effect, being less sensitive to outliers, is similar in magnitude to the effect
calculated at the mean characteristics in each column. We therefore consider the marginal
effect calculated at the mean characteristics as it is more representative of the activities of
the ‘average’ charity.
The results suggest that the ‘average’ development charity maximizes net revenue in
the short run as the short-run marginal effect (calculated at the mean characteristics) is not
statistically different from one (P-value = 0.941). In the long run, the results suggest that
the ‘average’charity fundraises short of net revenuemaximization as the long-runmarginal
effect (calculated at the mean characteristics) is different from one (P-value = 0.020). This
means that charities fundraise at an ‘inefﬁciently’ low level; charities could increase both
fundraising expenditure and programme services. The reasons for this inefﬁciency are not
immediately clear but may be a function of the perception that higher levels of fundraising
reduce donations via the supposed price effect. We have shown here that, in the case of
development charities, a reasonable observation rule for the price and controlling for serial
correlation in donations, result in the estimated price effect being close to zero and sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. Charity managers operating under the assumption that fundraising
expenditure will have a negative impact on donations via the price will underestimate the
revenue (net or gross)maximizing level of fundraising and so spend too little on fundraising.
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TABLE 4
Spillover effects of fundraising
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator: WG WG WG WG
Household characteristics Year ﬁxed effects
All No top 5 All No top 5
Log spillover 0.076 0.144 0.191** 0.300***
(0.163) (0.186) (0.075) (0.087)
Observations 684 554 684 554
R2 0.643 0.616 0.658 0.636
Notes: WG, within-group. The spillover effect is captured by including a
variable equal to the log of the total fundraising expenditure of the ﬁve largest
development fundraisers in each year. In columns (1) and (2), we use the same
speciﬁcation as our baseline model, though the ﬁve largest fundraisers are
excluded in column (2). In columns (3) and (4),we use year ﬁxed effects instead
of the macro-level variables in our baseline speciﬁcation. We exclude the ﬁve
largest fundraisers in column (4). Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance according to the following schedule:
*10%, **5% and ***1%.
Spillover effects of fundraising
To test for a fundraising spillover effect (see section II) among development charities,
we construct a new variable that is equal to the total annual fundraising expenditure of
the ﬁve charities with the most fundraising expenditure in each year.17 This construction
preferable to using the total fundraising of all other (−i) development charities as the
number of development charities in the sample changes from year to year thus causing
artiﬁcial changes in such a total.
We re-estimate our partial adjustment model including the log of this new ‘spillover’
variable. We present the estimated spillover effect in Table 4.
In columns (1) and (2), we estimate the model using the aggregate household char-
acteristics, charity-speciﬁc and development-speciﬁc variables. The point estimate on
the spillover variable is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant. In column (2), where we
exclude those charities among the ﬁve largest fundraisers (from which the spillover vari-
able was constructed), the coefﬁcient on household income (not reported) becomes in-
signiﬁcant, though the magnitude of the coefﬁcient is not materially changed from our
baseline model.18 There is, however, a large (= 0.616) and signiﬁcant (P-value < 0.001)
correlation between the spillover variable and household income. This collinearity may
make identiﬁcation difﬁcult.
To address this possibility, we replace the aggregate household and development-
speciﬁc variables with year ﬁxed effects and re-estimate the model for all development
charities in column (3) and excluding theﬁve largest fundraisers in column (4).The spillover
17
Our results below are not sensitive to ranking charities by donation income instead of fundraising expenditure.
18
Note that, neither the magnitude nor signiﬁcance of the other coefﬁcients were materially affected in any of the
models in Table 4.
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effect remains positive, though is now well identiﬁed. This suggests that an increase in the
fundraising expenditure of the largest fundraisers leads to an increase in donations to other
development charities, on average and ceteris paribus. The point estimate on the spillover
effect is similar in size to that on fundraising in our baseline model, 0.19. However, the
magnitude of the effect is much smaller. Using the results in column (3), a one standard
deviation increase in the fundraising expenditure of the very largest development charities
increases average donations to other development charities by about 9%. Whereas a one
standard deviation increase in a charity’s own fundraising will see donations increase by
about a third.
VI. Conclusions
In this article, we have modelled the determinants of donations received by overseas de-
velopment charities in the UK, contributing to the relatively small literature on charitable
giving that considers particular causes. We have used panel data that span over 25 years
and we have drawn on recent theory on giving for overseas causes. Given the length of the
panel we use, we are able to include controls for donor (macroeconomic) characteristics,
macro-level events that affect donations to development charities as well as a possible
autoregressive process in donations. Our results may be summarized as follows:
• A partial adjustment speciﬁcation is a useful advance on the static models previously
used in the literature. The partial adjustment speciﬁcation we use allows us to identify
both short-run and long-run impacts of regressors.
• Fundraising has a powerful effect on donations received by development charities with
a short-run elasticity of 0.19 and a long-run elasticity which is approximately twice the
size of the short-run elasticity.
• We ﬁnd that the impact of the price faced by donors, as conventionally deﬁned in
the literature, is not a signiﬁcant determinant of donations when we control for the
autoregressive process driving donations.
• We ﬁnd some evidence that the relationship between the public provision of the public
good in the formofODAand donations fundamentally changed following theEthiopian
famine of the mid-1980s. Prior to the famine, our results are consistent with ODA
crowding out donations. After the famine, the evidence suggests the effect reversed.
• We cannot reject the hypothesis that giving to overseas development has a unitary
income elasticity in both the short and long run. We ﬁnd no robust signiﬁcant impact
from changes in the inequality of household incomes, holding constant total income
though there is some weak evidence suggesting that increased inequality decreases
giving for development.
• Conclusions about the marginal effect of fundraising and the objective functions of
charity managers depends on whether the analysis considers the mean marginal effect
or the marginal effect calculated at the mean characteristics.
• There is some evidence of a positive fundraising externality. The fundraising expendi-
ture of the largest development charities increases the revenue not only of the fundrais-
ing charity itself but that of other development charities as well.
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